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To date, there have been over 2.7 million deaths and more than 126 million cases
attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic (JHU, 2021). This pandemic has affected nearly
every aspect of daily life. Among those impacted are U.S. firefighters, as they provide
many services beyond simply extinguishing structure fires and are frequently dual
certified as emergency medical technicians. Many of the victims of this pandemic have
relied on first responders to provide them with emergency medical care and hospital
transport. When caring for these infected patients, firefighters have an increased risk of
exposure and must be provided with adequate resources and guidance on how to best
protect themselves. To assess the COVID-19 pandemic plans utilized by U.S. fire
departments, this study performed a qualitative review of COVID-19 pandemic plans
from metropolitan fire departments across the nation. The fire department policies were
compared to the 117 recommendations established by national and international
authorities on COVID-19. Analysis of the fire department COVID-19 plans revealed 29
recommendations that were followed by all agencies reviewed, 72 recommendations that
were intermittently acknowledged, and 16 recommendations that were included in no fire
departments plans. The study also identified unique practices in the COVID-19 infection
prevention and control plans reviewed.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Background
Firefighters (FFs) in the United States (U.S.) respond to all requests for assistance
whenever a hazard is present or may potentially develop. Fire agencies refer to this
obligation as an all-hazards response approach, striving to save lives and mitigate the
dangers associated with fires, Haz-Mat events, motor vehicle accidents, medical
emergencies, specialized rescues, and any other incident where harm to life or damage to
property may occur. Roughly 65% of fire department emergency responses in the U.S. are
to care for people who are in medical distress (NFPA, 2019). In recognition of medical call
volumes, many fire departments employ FFs who are cross-trained as Emergency Medical
Technicians (EMTs). These firefighter-emergency medical technicians (FF-EMTs) receive
training on the proper treatment of patients suffering from a wide variety of medical
emergencies. Medical emergencies frequently present situations where emergency
responders come into contact with infectious body substances. To minimize the infectious
exposures in the U.S., all organizations employing health care workers (HCWs) are
federally mandated to implement training and education for their personnel on
bloodborne pathogens, respiratory protection, and personal protective equipment
(OSHA, 2011, 2012, 2016)). Many organizations choose to implement Infection
Prevention and Control (IPC) programs, which are a holistic approach to infection
prevention.
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Fire departments educate and train their emergency response personnel on the
appropriate levels of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and Body Substance Isolation
(BSI) procedures for the diverse variety of emergency calls that they will respond to. Each
fire department must develop its own unique IPC program and ensure that they can
provide their personnel with the necessary PPE for every emergency that they may
encounter. What level of PPE should first responders don when facing a novel infectious
disease with unknown transmission characteristics? What BSI policies do fire
departments enact amid worldwide PPE shortages? The current COVID-19 pandemic has
forced many fire departments in the U.S. to reanalyze the efficacy of the infectious disease
policies that they have instituted. This thesis will compare pandemic IPC policies from
multiple

metropolitan

area

fire

departments

across

the

country

with

the

recommendations set forth by numerous agencies, including the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) and the World Health Organization (WHO) to identify
crucial IPC elements and to shed light upon standard IPC components needing
improvement. There is currently a significant deficit in available research for this
important and relevant issue.

Pandemics
According to the WHO, when a novel disease is discovered that spreads across
multiple countries and affects large numbers of people with no apparent immunity, it is
under their authority and obligation to issue a global pandemic declaration (LOC,

2020)(WHO, 2010). The classical term "pandemic" has been argued to relate to a disease's
geographic spread and not the effect that it has on people (Kelly, 2011). The current
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COVID-19 pandemic, however, has had a significant effect on humanity, surpassing 126
million identified cases and causing greater than 2.7 million deaths worldwide (JHU,

2021a). The WHO is cautious about its responsibility in declaring global pandemics. In
his work, Madhav et al. discusses how pandemics can have substantial noteworthy
societal ramifications, often disrupting national economies, impacting the health of a
population, and can also cause significant amounts of public panic (Madhav et al., 2017).
Following the declaration of a pandemic, specific control measures are implemented
globally in an attempt to stop or minimize the spread of the disease, the WHO refers to
these as Public Health and Social Measures (PHSM). PHSMs include disease surveillance
and response measures (contact tracing, isolation, and quarantine orders), personal
protective measures (encouraging frequent hand washing and public face mask
requirements), environmental measures (increased general cleaning, implementing
improved ventilation systems, and disinfection), physical distancing measures (domestic
travel restrictions, stay at home orders, and social distancing requirements), and also
encouraging the implementation of international travel restrictions (WHO, 2020b).
The most devastating pandemic to have occurred in the 20th century was the 1918
H1N1 influenza. Although the origins of this pandemic are still unclear, the first
documented case occurred in January 1918, in Haskell County, Kansas, and was caused
by a strain of the H1N1 virus, which DNA sequencing has revealed to be most similar to
an avian species virus (Barry, 2004). It is estimated that the 1918 H1N1 influenza infected
approximately 500 million people (roughly 1/3 of the world's population at the time),
caused 50 million fatalities, and lowered the life expectancy in the U.S. by over 12 years
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(Jordan, 2019). In the years following the 1918 H1N1 pandemic, many advancements have
been made in the field of medical sciences, including the introduction of vaccinations,
antivirals, and antibiotics, the ability to diagnose and study influenza viruses, the
establishment of intensive care units with mechanical ventilation, and also the
development of plans relating to pandemics and infection control (Jester et al., 2018).
Even with all the scientific advancements that have been made since 1918, humans are
still incredibly vulnerable to influenza viruses. Many reasons contribute to this influenza
vulnerability; among them is the exponential population growth that has occurred since
1918. Population growth has increased population density in many regions throughout
the world, which closely correlates to disease propagation (Li et al., 2018). This
population growth has increased the necessity for food supplies, correlating to increased
swine and poultry populations. The swine and poultry species have both been recognized
as notable intermediaries for zoonotic diseases (Gray & Kayali, 2009). Strong evidence
suggests that the expansion of modern farming practices into previously isolated wildlife
habitats, combined with the increase in human interactions with livestock, correlates to
the increased incidence and intensification of emerging diseases (Jones et al., 2013).
The most recent of our past pandemics to occur was the 2009 H1N1pdm09
pandemic. The first laboratory-confirmed case of the 2009 pandemic was observed in
Mexico in February, and from there, the virus rapidly spread around the world (Fineberg,

2014). The CDC estimates that the 2009 pandemic caused 115,700 – 575,000 global fatalities
(CDC, 2019). This virus was very unusual in that 80% of the attributed deaths occurred
in populations younger than 65 years of age. During a typical flu season, 70-90% of the

5
mortalities occur in populations 65 years of age and over. The fact that the 2009 pandemic
had a more significant effect on younger populations caused some scientific communities
to speculate that the older population had likely been exposed to an earlier circulating
H1N1 virus, developing ostensible immunities to this new H1N1 variant (Morens et al.,

2010).
On December 31, 2019, the WHO received notification concerning a cluster of
atypical pneumonia cases in China's Wuhan Peninsula. In 3 months, the number of
infected escalated to over 118,000 cases in more than 110 countries. On March 11, 2020,
the WHO made the declaration that the novel Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) had
reached pandemic levels (WHO, 2020a). The viral load necessary for conversion from
exposure to infection is still unknown, but COVID-19 is transmitted with relative ease via
person-to-person airborne droplets and has an incubation period of approximately 2-14
days (Dhama et al., 2020). COVID-19 is caused by the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). Common symptoms experienced with COVID-19 infections
include fever or chills, cough, shortness of breath or difficulty breathing, fatigue, muscle
or body aches, headache, the new loss of taste or smell, sore throat, congestion or runny
nose, nausea or vomiting, and diarrhea (CDC, 2020a). The rapidity in which COVID-19
has spread may be due in part to the fact that asymptomatic transmission has been
observed in 59% of cases (Johansson et al., 2021). SARS-CoV-2 has been found to have a
case fatality rate of 2.3% (Wu & McGoogan, 2020). Infected individuals should be
considered contagious 2-3 days before the initiation of symptoms (He et al., 2020). The
CDC reports that those with mild to moderate COVID-19 symptoms have been found to
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remain infectious for up to 10 days after the onset of symptoms, and individuals who are
critically ill can remain infectious for up to 20 days after symptoms begin (CDC, October

19, 2020). Significant comorbidities that have been associated with severe COVID-19
infections

include

old

age,

hypertension,

diabetes,

cardiovascular

disease,

cerebrovascular disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disorders, renal disease, and past
cancer diagnoses (Fang et al., 2020).

Fire Departments and Pandemics
FF-EMTs encounter a wide variety of patients in very dynamic environments,
often facing weather extremes, poor lighting, and many other unpredictable hazards.
When working in these uncontrolled environments, Emergency Medical Services (EMS)
providers face considerably elevated risks of exposure to infectious diseases (Leiss et al.,

2006). In an attempt to mitigate as many of the controllable hazards as possible, fire
departments generally develop Operational Guidelines (OGs) and Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs). These SOPs and OGs have become the standard of practice in the fire
service and serve as guidance for emergency personnel on the correct courses of action to
take when specific situations present themselves (Warren, 2016). Many fire departments
develop numerous volumes of detailed SOPs and OGs for common incidents encountered
(i.e., structure fires, EMS responses). However, they may lack robust SOPs/OGs for
uncommon events, such as pandemics. The Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) mandates that employers with HCWs implement programs to
protect their personnel against bloodborne pathogens and previously identified
respiratory infections such as tuberculosis (TB), Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus
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aureus (MRSA), and Influenza; however, current federal regulations do not specifically
address policies on emerging infectious diseases transmitted through other routes
(OSHA, 2020b). The minimally available data to date imply that the U.S.' current EMS
system is ill-prepared to respond to a severe pandemic, with specific deficiencies
identified in industry-wide decontamination practices, infection control practices,
pandemic preparedness frameworks, and EMS providers' willingness to respond to
infectious disease.

In his work, Ventura et al. discovered an absence of national

disinfection standards regarding EMS equipment, finding that disinfection practices were
guided solely by specific EMS agency standards or local protocols (Ventura et al., 2020).
Ventura et al. found that the disinfection of stethoscopes between patient contact was not
a regular practice. In a different study, Nunez et al. determined stethoscopes to be ideal
fomites, harboring various pathogens, but they were readily cleaned with isopropyl
alcohol (Nunez et al., 2000).
The recent observed worldwide PPE shortages have caused countless disruptions
to the entire healthcare industry, but these shortfalls have been uniquely profound to EMS
providers working in uncontrolled prehospital environments. The 2011 National EMS
Assessment indicated significant deficits in the national pandemic framework, with
specific insufficiencies identified with federal, state, and local integration plans;
decontamination capabilities; continuity of operations plans; mass casualty transportation
resources; and PPE supply caches (Mears, 2011).
FF's respond emergently to hazardous situations while assessing the potential
risks and following well-developed and coordinated protocols. Firefighters will enter a
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burning building to extinguish the fire and save the lives of others but will only do so with
the appropriate complement of PPE, capable of withstanding extremely high
temperatures and providing them with breathable air. FF-EMTs responding to medical
emergencies do so with this same mindset; making assessments of the potential dangers,
donning the proscribed PPE compliments, and will only then proceed appropriately.
When FF-EMTs lack the appropriate protocols or PPE compliments, there is real potential
that they may decide the risks of response are too significant. In a study conducted by
Barnett et al., paramedics were asked about their willingness to respond to infectious
disease patients when presented with a scenario in which they were provided inadequate
PPE levels for an infectious disease, and with no prospective vaccine. Unsurprisingly,
only 4% of the surveyed participants reported that they "probably would" stay on duty.
Of the respondents presented with the previous scenario, 83% of the paramedics indicated
that they "would definitely not" or "probably not" remain on duty. When the same group
of paramedics were queried on their willingness to remain on duty if provided with
adequate PPE and also provided with a vaccine for the disease, 91% of the participants
indicated that they "probably" or "definitely" would remain on duty (Barnett et al., 2010).
U.S. EMS providers are paramount to our nation's health, especially so during a national
disaster such as a pandemic. The importance of providing them with the proper IPC
protocols, PPE, and available vaccination therapies cannot be understated. Many
paramedics in the above study indicated that their primary fears were related not to
themselves becoming infected but the risk that they could potentially infect their family
members (Alwidyan et al., 2020).
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Health care workers rely on PPE as a last line of defense. PPE serves to protect
HCWs when all other administrative, engineering, and work practice controls are unable
to protect them from potentially infectious exposures. The worldwide PPE shortages
experienced during the COVID-19 pandemic effectively took this last line of defense
away. In a survey of 23,000 U.S. nurses, 87% of the respondents reported having to reuse
single-use disposable N95 respirators. Of those, 27% stated that they had been exposed to
confirmed COVID-19 patients without utilizing the proper levels of PPE (United, 2020).
A similar survey consisting of EMTs in the U.S. discovered that only 48% of the
respondents reported having access to the proper N95 masks when needed. Of those, 31%
reported having to reuse disposable (single-use) for one week or greater. Additionally,
16% of the EMT participants from the survey reported that they suffered injuries due to
excessive PPE wear (Ventura, 2020). The consequences related to the overuse of PPE can
include skin injuries and a noted decrease in the efficacy of PPE for both source and
exposure control.

Statement of the Problem
Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, EMS personnel have worked tirelessly on
the front lines, with insufficient PPE, fighting an invisible enemy, all while following
frequently guideline changes. OSHA defines FF-EMTs as professionals who are at "very
high exposure risk" to the COVID-19 virus (OSHA, 2020a). The significance of this
exposure risk was revealed when COVID-19 was found to be the leading cause of FF line
of duty deaths (LODD) in the U.S. for the year 2020 (USFA, 2020b). EMS providers play
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a pivotal role in the healthcare system, initiating lifesaving first aid to critically injured
patients.
In a recent survey involving nearly 4000 professionals employed in the public
service sector (Police, FFs, EMTs, Paramedics, and Corrections Officers), the results
suggested that FF's were the least likely respondents to wear face masks (Friese, Jul 31,

2020). Given the novelty of the COVID-19 virus and the lack of available scientific
evidence regarding its transmission characteristics, FF-EMTs must adamantly practice the
procedures that we know to be effective in stopping the spread of this virus. One of the
most significant components of COVID-19 IPC is the widespread use of facemasks. The
fact that FFs are the emergency service professionals who have been found to be the least
likely group to wear face masks, coupled with the fact that COVID-19 was a significant
cause of FF LODDs in 2020, is a clear indicator that there are significant IPC deficits in the
fire service. During COVID-19, several fire departments across the U.S. have been
deficient in formalized pandemic SOPs, communicating pandemic guidelines to their
personnel via departmental memos. The nature in which these memos have been
delivered and recorded has made them difficult to reference.
Critically ill COVID-19 patients are found to possess higher viral loads, correlating
to the shedding of higher viral particulates inside their poorly ventilated homes (To et al.,

2020). FF-EMTs generally make contact with these particular patients inside of their
contaminated residences, as these patients are frequently too ill to ambulate outside.
During these interactions, it is paramount for emergency responders to practice good BSI
procedures while utilizing the necessary PPE. Personnel who respond to these events
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must also practice the appropriate decontamination procedures when doffing their PPE.
Firefighting is an inherently dangerous occupation, and the current pandemic has only
increased this profession's associated hazards.

Project Significance
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) reports that there are roughly
1,115,000 FFs, associated with over 29,705 fire departments, who respond to 36,746,500
emergency calls in the US every year (Evarts, 2020). Firefighters provide the communities
in which they work with many essential services. The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed
numerous pandemic IPC vulnerabilities within this critical infrastructure sector. This
thesis aims to identify the necessary components required for a successful pandemic IPC
plan and to characterize common pandemic IPC policy strengths and insufficiencies. This
thesis intends to serve as a reference tool for fire departments when developing or revising
pandemic related protocols.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
PPE Shortages
During the COVID-19 pandemic, significant deficits were observed in the essential
PPE caches for the HCW population (SHEA, 2019). Possessing adequate levels of the
necessary PPE during an infectious disease outbreak is a crucial non-pharmaceutical
component to the successful disease containment within a population (Lemon, 2007).
When HCWs treat infected patients without the appropriate levels of PPE or effective IPC
policies in place, the likelihood that they will become infected increases. HCWs who
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become infected will no longer be able to perform their job duties, frequently facing
lengthy isolation/quarantine periods, and can often contribute to the further taxing of an
already burdened health care system. HCWs represent between 2-3% of a communities
population; however, they make up 14% of the COVID-19 infections (WHO, 2020c). When
utilizing improper PPE, HCWs inadvertently generate conditions in which they may serve
as vectors for disease transmission. Previous works have shed light on the numerous cases
where HCWs have unknowingly transmitted disease to their own patients (Huttunen &

Syrjänen, 2014). By wearing appropriate levels of PPE and following well-developed IPC
plans, HCWs can better protect themselves and the patients for whom they are providing
care. Due to the recent worldwide PPE shortages, many fire departments and emergency
response agencies in the U.S. have been forced to supplement the use of N95 masks with
commercial-grade elastomeric respirators. These masks have proven to be an effective
means of protecting the individuals wearing them from COVID-19; however, these types
of masks frequently lack filtered exhalation valves, allowing any infected mask wearer to
disperse viral particulates into the environment (Chang et al., 2020). When considering
that 59% of the COVID-19 cases in one study were transmitted from asymptomatic
carriers, there is a high likelihood that infected wearers of unfiltered masks could serve as
vectors for COVID-19 transmission (Johansson et al., 2021). No peer-reviewed studies
have been conducted at this time to illustrate the risks of COVID-19 transmission and
particulate masks with unfiltered exhalation valves.
Thousands of firefighters have been infected, and hundreds have been killed from
COVID-19. FF-EMT personnel have a significantly higher risk of COVID-19 infections
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than the general population (Leiss et al., 2006; OSHA, 2020a; USFA, 2020b). One factor
that has been associated with the elevated risk of COVID-19 infections in the FF-EMT
population has been the shortages of essential PPE and disinfectant supplies (Terri

Rebmann et al., 2020). The insufficient caches of disaster supplies and PPE is a
vulnerability that has existed for decades, having been identified in multiple previously
conducted national EMS assessments (FICEMS, 2009; Mears, 2011). The cause of this PPE
shortage has been attributed to multiple complex issues, ranging from explosive
consumer demand, limited agency budgets, government planning, and preparedness
failures, to disruptions in the global supply chain (Cohen & Rodgers, 2020). This thesis
will not seek to resolve this widespread PPE shortage issue; however, it may provide
potential recognized options for the appropriate disinfection and reuse of this vital PPE.

Important Pandemic IPC Elements
When facing a pandemic, preparation is a tremendous key to success. Success is
vital when considering that failure equates to the potential loss of human life and
preventable casualties. The EMS Infectious Disease Playbook lays out a roadmap for
agencies to develop pandemic IPC programs (EMS Infectious Disease Playbook 2017).
Among the many reliable resources available to fire departments when developing and
implementing IPC programs, the Association for Professionals in Infection Control and
Epidemiology (APIC) has been recognized as a national authority on the best-of-practice
in infection control (NEMSSC, 2017). The APIC has developed tools for fire departments
to utilize when creating tailored IPC programs for their institutions. The APIC reports that
the six major components to a successful IPC program are administrative controls,
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engineering controls, work practice controls, education, medical management, and the
establishment of immunization programs (Woodside, 2013). The APIC recommended

infection control program components are detailed in Table 1, below.

-

-

-

Administrative Controls
Surveillance Programs
Up-To-Date Infection Control
Policies and Procedures
Exposure Control Plans
Referenceable and Dynamic
Policies
Routine Hazard Risk
Assessments
Work Practice Controls
Frequent Hand Washing
Standard Precautions – PPE
Employee Screening
Proper Decon Practices
Disposal of Contaminated
PPE
Environmental
Decontamination
Facility Social Distancing
Practices
Medical Management
PSAP Triaging
Limiting Personnel Exposure
Interacting in Well
Ventilated Areas
On Scene Assessment and
Distancing
EMS & Patient PPE
Exposure Prophylaxis

-

-

-

Engineering Controls
Adequate PPE Caches
Decontamination Facilities
Appropriate Cleaning/Disinfecting
Agents
Necessary Safety Equipment

Education
Initial and Recurrent Infection Control
Practices
Current and Emerging Infectious
Threats
Frequent & Routine Policy Review

Immunization Program
Ensuring Personnel Are Immunized
Against Vaccine-Preventable Diseases
Ensuring Personnel Will Receive
Priority for Novel Vaccines

Table 1. APIC Infection Control Program Components
Additional resources regarding pandemic specific IPC recommendations are
available from the CDC and the WHO. The CDC released a set of interim
recommendations for the U.S. EMS System & Public Safety Answering Points (PSAP) after
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the COVID-19 pandemic was declared. One of the fundamental principles stressed in this
document was the promotion of improved coordination and communication between
PSAPs, EMS agencies, and hospitals (CDC, 2020c). The dissemination and sharing of
accurate information is an incredibly important function during pandemic declarations
(HHS, 2021). The increased use of social media platforms by those who view them as
reliable news outlets poses serious potential implications (Pennycook et al., 2020). Fire
Departments should only utilize accurate information provided by trusted and verified
resources when developing policies for their personnel. During an infectious disease
outbreak or pandemic, emergency response agencies should coordinate closely with their
PSAP to develop and institute a set of modified caller queries to screen patients early for
potential signs and symptoms of infection. PSAP 911 dispatchers should relay pertinent
patient information to responding crews and instruct the patient to don a facemask before
emergency crews arrive, if available (CDC, 2020c; EMS Infectious Disease Playbook

2017).
Surveillance
This thesis's focus will not regard public health surveillance systems; however, it
should be stated that these programs must be well functioning so that emerging infectious
disease outbreaks are identified early, and the appropriate policies are implemented
before the inadvertent exposure of personnel occurs. When departmental surveillance
programs fail to recognize potential infectious threats, events similar to what happened
in Kirkland, Washington can occur. In late February 2020, 31 FF-EMTs were unknowingly
exposed to COVID-19 after responding to a nursing home where several patients
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ultimately died from COVID-19 (Malcolm, 2020). After reviewing the call run logs for
this facility, FF-EMTs later admitted that they should have recognized this infectious
outbreak event. Fire Departments should provide emergency crews with sufficient
education to recognize the signs and symptoms of potential infectious outbreaks and
report their observations to the appropriate agency staff members. In a survey conducted
by Rebmann et al., EMS personnel who received targeted pandemic training where they
were educated on and provided with adequate levels of PPE were identified to have an
increased willingness to work during infectious disease outbreaks and expressed greater
confidence in treating infectious patients (T. Rebmann et al., 2020). Rebmann et al. further
discussed how these education curriculums should be specific and include the most
current epidemiological information relating to emerging infectious diseases available.

Preparation and Prevention
The CDC recommends that before starting their shifts, fire department personnel
should be screened for the signs and symptoms of potential infection, with active
temperature checks being completed prior to entering crew quarters. Resources on the
updated signs and symptoms of COVID-19 infections should be reviewed on the CDC
website (CDC, 2020d). PPE training should include didactic and practical segments on
proper donning and doffing procedures. Given that nearly 40% of the doctors and nurses
in a PPE study were observed to be practicing the doffing process incorrectly, it is likely
that many EMS professionals, who operate in uncontrolled prehospital environments,
would have similar, if not higher, risk for improper PPE doffing (Okamoto et al., 2019).
The CDC recommends that emergency response agencies should implement universal
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source control measures for personnel during the entirety of their shifts, as well as
implementing comprehensive social distancing policies while in station quarters and on
agency apparatus (CDC, 2020c). Both of these practices will minimize the risk of personto-person transmission and help maintain the vital adequate staffing levels. Crews should
receive training on the proper disinfection techniques for the stations, equipment, and
apparatus. The U.S. Fire Administration provides fire departments with disinfection
resources and has created numerous volumes of industry related disinfection guides
(USFA, 2020a).

Response
The CDC recommends that first responders should receive COVID-19 screening
information from the PSAP 911 dispatchers while responding to emergency calls (CDC,

2020c). FF-EMTs should follow departmental policy when deciding which level of PPE to
don. Many fire departments are developing progressive policies, whereby FF-EMTs are
contacting 911 callers while enroute to the scene and initiating their own surveillance.
These policies help responding crews get a better picture of the nature of the call and the
PPE required once on scene. Due to the high rate of asymptomatic carriers, fire
departments should utilize policies that will protect their personnel from inadvertent
exposures of this population. Once personnel arrive to an emergency, they should
perform scene surveillance, minimize crew exposure, and attempt to maintain the 6 feet
social distancing recommendation (CDC, 2020c).
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Contact Tracing
In coordinating with local PSAPs on the screening of COVID-19, fire departments
should also establish relationships and channels of communication with area hospitals.
The CDC reports that developing effective means of communication about emerging
infectious diseases is important for every participant involved in community health
(CDC, 2020c). EMS should provide local hospitals with early warning when they are
transporting potentially infected patients so that hospital HCWs can appropriately
prepare for their arrival. When hospitals determine that an infected patient was
transported to their facility via EMS, they should notify that provider of the potential
exposure risks encountered. This open communication during a pandemic will help
protect HCWs in the hospital and prehospital settings more effectively, better protecting
this vital workforce

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
Project Objective
The purpose of this thesis project is to use national and international
recommendations for emergency responder IPC policies to compare and contrast plans
from fire departments across the U.S. Common practices will be identified, along with
missing or incomplete criteria, and recommendations will be made for improvement to
plans to ensure consistency of planning across the nation.
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Sample Population
IPC plans relating to the current COVID-19 pandemic were collected from large
metropolitan area fire departments. The convenience sample of fire departments included
in this study were selected because they represented different geographic regions across
the U.S., providing essential services to diverse populations, including communities
located in urban, suburban, as well as rural areas. Internet searches were performed to
locate the contact information for the fire agency headquarters (HQ). Communication was
made with the fire department HQs and contact information for the agency infection
control officer was requested. The fire departments were contacted via telephone & email.
The agencies infection control officers were contacted, explained our study's details and
objectives, and requested to participate. Each agency was informed that all identifying
information regarding the participating organizations IPC programs would be excluded
from the final report. The documents requested from each fire department included all
available documentation that they had prepared relating to COVID-19. The study
received universal support from the agencies we were able to make contact with, and
significant interest was expressed in the need for additional studies of this nature. Several
of the agencies contacted had formal processes for public information requests through
their municipalities' Human Resources Department. The formal requests for these agency
documents were made, and delays were encountered due to the ongoing pandemic, as
many HR departments were very short staffed. The 6 fire departments that eventually
supplied the study with IPC documentation included career fire agencies from the
Southeast, Midwest, and Northwest regions of the U.S. The largest fire department
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included in this study has over 70 fire-rescue stations and more than 2700 employees. The
smallest fire department included in the study has 16 stations and greater than 300
employees. The documents obtained from the different fire agencies were received via
email and accessed from online website addresses that agency personnel provided to the
study.

Data Collection Method
Pandemic IPC guidance documents were accessed and obtained from multiple
recognized authorities in the fire service and public health industries. The authorities
referenced were the CDC, the WHO, the U.S. Fire Administration, The International
Association of Firefighters union (IAFF), the Technical Resources, Assistance Center, and
Information Exchange (TRACIE), APIC, The Federal Healthcare Resilience Working
Group (HRWG), and OSHA. These documents were reviewed, and specific IPC elements
were identified and categorized from each. The specific identified IPC elements from the
recognized authorities were recorded onto a spreadsheet and used as criteria for
comparison of pandemic plan data. The assembled national and international authority
IPC recommendations entered into the spreadsheet were utilized to create a master IPC
template. This IPC evaluation criteria template was used to analyze and compare IPC
elements from the convenience sample of fire department plans. IPC element criteria
included components such as personnel screening, facility decontamination, equipment
decontamination, apparatus decontamination, required PPE, PPE decontamination and
reuse procedures, personnel decontamination procedures, social distancing guidelines,
training protocols, contact tracing functions, mealtime accommodations, common crew
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area recommendations, visitor policies, confirmed exposures, quarantine & isolation
guidelines, PSAP call taker queries, on-scene patient management, and special situations.

Study Data
The documents obtained from each fire department were reviewed while cross
referencing the study's IPC evaluation criteria template. Fire department IPC elements
that were identified as correlating with the study's IPC evaluation criteria template were
recorded on to the template’s spreadsheet. This comparison evaluation identified
common strengths and weaknesses in the individual fire agency pandemic plans and
compared the particular programs to one another.

CHAPTER 4: RESULTS
IPC Evaluation Criteria Template
The national and international COVID-19 IPC guidance elements were reviewed
and organized into the following categories to serve as review criteria for the plan
evaluation and comparison: public safety answering points (PSAP) modified screening
questions, infectious disease training, PPE, fire department facilities, patient treatment
practices, cleaning and disinfection procedures, post-exposure definitions and actions,
contact tracing & documentation, continuity of operations/workforce protection,
ambulance operations, and also special considerations. The studies’ final IPC evaluation
criteria template consisted of 12 categories that comprised 117 separate pandemic-related
elements.
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The study was ultimately able to collect and review over 100 COVID-19 pandemic
guidance documents from six professional fire departments across the U.S. The various
documents received from the participating agencies included Operational Guidelines,
Chiefs Memos, Operational Memos, Standard Operating Procedures, City Press Releases,
Emergency Medical Protocols, Municipal Policies, Response Procedures, Medical Services
Training Memos, Statewide Ordinances, Training Pamphlets, Training Videos, Checklists,
and also Just-In-Time Training documents. All of the documents above will be referred to
as fire department pandemic IPC plans from this point forward, although the limitations
of this are discussed later.
The information provided by each fire agency was reviewed, analyzed, and
recorded into the study's IPC evaluation criteria template. Of the 117 IPC elements
included in the studies IPC evaluation criteria, the agency that accounted for the most
significant number of IPC elements had policies that included 77 (66%) of these in their
plans. To identify these 77 IPC elements, the study authors had to review 26 separate
documents from that agency. The
fire agency that accounted for the

(Chart 1)

117 Recommended COVID-19
IPC Elements

least amount of the recommended
elements had policies in place that

14%
33%

covered 48 (41%) of the 117 IPC
recommendations.
components

were

The

48

identified

following the review of the seven

29 IPC Elements Included
by Every Agency

25%
28%

33 IPC Elements included
by 66-83% of the Agencies

39 IPC Elements Included
by 16-50% of the Agencies
16 IPC Elements Not
Included by any Agency
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provided departmental documents. Of the 117 recommended COVID-19 IPC elements, 29
were included by every agency reviewed. 33 Of the IPC elements were included in 6688% of the agencies reviewed. 39 Of the IPC elements were included in 16-50% agencies.
16 Of the IPC elements were unaccounted for by all agencies reviewed (chart 1).

Most Common Recommended IPC Elements
The elements of the IPC evaluation criteria template that were consistently listed
by every participating fire department's COVID-19 plan are provided in Table: 2.
Table 2: COVID-19 IPC Components Accounted for by Every Fire Department Surveyed
Pandemic Plan Elements:
All department personnel are provided
copies of the pandemic documents

The plan is developed in coordination
with local healthcare partners.

Personnel are provided details about the
Specific PPE criteria is detailed for the
pandemic, infection prevention, and
emergency call type and patient
control practices.
symptomology
Strategies in Place to Optimize PPE Supplies
Personnel interactions are limited with
patients

Personnel use of reusable PPE

IPC Plan Includes Appropriate Use of the Following PPE
Eye protection

Respiratory protection

Gowns or suits

Gloves

Patient Treatment Guidelines
PPE use is determined by reported
patient symptomology and departmental
guidance
Patients and family on scene must wear
face masks during every interaction
If patient requires O2, airway device is
used in conjunction with face mask

Infection screening is performed on every
patient
N95 or better respiratory protection is
worn by personnel on all patient
interactions
Aerosol-generating procedures are
defined and discussed

Early notification of a suspected COVID-19 patient is provided to the receiving
hospital
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Cleaning and Disinfection Procedures Provided for
Fire department facilities

EMS equipment

Fire department vehicles

Decon procedures for PPE

Establishment of approved disinfectants

Promotion of frequent hand hygiene

Post Exposure Definitions and Actions
High-risk exposures are defined, and the following actions are taken
14-day quarantine where individuals
will self-monitor for signs and
symptoms of infection

Individuals will quarantine for 10
-ORdays and if no symptoms are
observed following daily monitoring,
work restrictions are concluded
Contact Tracing and Documentation

Personnel who develop signs and
symptoms of infection shall self-isolate
and notify agency infection control officer
Return to work policies are in place for
infected personnel who have recovered

Personnel with on-the-job exposures are
documented and communicated with the
local health authorities to ensure accurate
contact tracing is performed
Every contact with a PUI is documented
through an agency established reporting
system.

IPC Components Observed in 66-88% of the Fire Departments
The elements of the IPC evaluation criteria template that were accounted for by
66-83% of the fire department COVID-19 plans reviewed are provided below (Table 3).
Table 3: IPC Elements in 66-83% of Fire Departments
Pandemic Plan Elements
A dedicated staff position is identified in the plan and is ultimately responsible for the
agency's infectious disease preparedness
Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) Modified Screening Questions
The plan indicates the implementation of
modified call taker screening criteria

911 call taker will ask about signs and
symptoms of infection

Call takers provide responding EMS with
early notification of positive infection
screening

911 call taker will ask about travel history
to effected regions

Infectious Disease Training
Training includes proper PPE donning and doffing procedures
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PPE
PPE contingencies are developed
(alternative PPE components are
provided and described)
Limited reuse of disposable PPE

-

Strategies are in place to optimize the
current PPE supplies
PPE is donned in correct order according
to departmental guidance

PPE doffing procedure:
Appropriate doffing procedures developed by agency
If personnel duty uniform under PPE is discovered to have become soiled,
personnel will return to station for uniform change
Soiled uniform items will be washed at the station with proscribed disease
prevention guidelines
Hand hygiene is performed
Fire Department Facilities

Sick personnel are directed to stay home

Personnel screening process is
implemented at the beginning of each
shift and detailed

Visitors are restricted from entering
Mask use is required during entire shift
facilities
Social distancing is mandated while inside agency facilities
Patient Treatment Practices
Hand hygiene is performed before and
after all patient contact
Number of personnel who contact
patients is limited

Patients should be moved outside to
ventilated area
Interacting with patient and family in
poorly ventilated environments is
avoided
Implementation of modified treat and
Metered dose inhalers are supplemented
release policies
instead of nebulizers
HEPA filters are used on advanced airway exhalation ports.
Post Exposure Definitions and Actions
Low-Risk Exposures are defined, and agency response is detailed
Contact Tracing
State or local public health authorities are notified of all PUI interactions
Continuity of Operations – Workforce Protection

Mental health counseling resources are available, and personnel are encouraged to
seek assistance if the need should arise
Ambulance Operations
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Ventilation strategies are optimized the in
Driver and patient compartments are
ambulance
separated
PPE guidelines are developed and in place to prevent contamination of driver
compartment

IPC Components in 16-50% of the Fire Departments
The elements of the IPC evaluation criteria template that were accounted for by
16-50% of the participating fire departments are provided in Table 4.
Table 4: IPC Components in 16-50% of the Fire Departments
Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) Modified Screening Questions
Known contact with infected persons

Call taker records call back phone
number and relays to responding crews
Additional persons at the location with signs and symptoms of infection
Infectious Disease Training

All non-essential in-person training is
Proper PPE Donning and Doffing
postponed in favor of pandemic-specific
procedures
virus-related training
Decon procedures for station, EMS equipment, PPE, & vehicles
PPE
PPE equipment caches are maintained,
appropriate quantities can be determined
using tools like those supplied by the
CDC's PPE Burn Rate Calculator or
equivalent
-

Doffing PPE:
Checklist is utilized
PPE is inspected for damage prior
to doffing
PPE is doffed in designated areas

Use of filtered respirator exhalation
valves is discussed (if present)

-

-

Donning PPE:
PPE is inspected to ensure it is
serviceable (absent of cuts or
tears, appropriate size)
Hand hygiene is performed

Use of boot covers while treating patients
Fire Department Facilities
Non-essential personnel work from home
and are provided the resources to do so
Hand sanitizer dispensers are readily
available

Personnel uniform items kept at station
Off going personnel shall shower before
going home
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Patient Treatment Practices
Personnel are instructed to avoid touching
their face

Only necessary equipment is brought to
the patient scene to avoid unnecessary
equipment contamination
Cleaning and Disinfection Procedures:

Use of disinfectant wipes is encouraged
Biohazard cleaners are contracted for
opposed to sprays, when in enclosed
gross station decontamination
compartments
Facility outbreak is declared if a workplace Decontamination checklists are created
has two or more confirmed or probable
and provided to crews
infection cases within 14 days
Post Exposure Definitions and Actions
Personnel quarantine is discontinued after Day 7, following a diagnostic specimen
negative test, with no observed symptoms during daily monitoring
Continuity of Operations – Workforce Protection
Nonpunitive sick-leave policies are
developed for personnel with on-duty
exposures
Vaccinations are strongly encouraged

Contact is maintained with employees
in quarantine and planning is made for
their replacements
Novel virus vaccine delivery plans are
developed for the rapid vaccination of
all department personnel

Telecommuting tools provided for nonessential employees and leadership
positions

Non-essential department personnel are
reassigned and retrained to assist in
mission-essential tasks

Additional emergency response vehicles are staffed to meet patient surge needs
Ambulance Operations:
Additional passengers (family, etc.) shall
not be transported with patient

Non-essential compartments and
cabinets for patient care are sealed

PUI transfer of care process into the hospital is developed according to local
guidelines, to minimize interaction with unprotected individuals

Absent IPC Elements
Several of the recommended IPC elements were discovered to be missing from
every fire department included in this study. The missing IPC elements are listed in Table
5.
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Table 5: IPC Recommendations Not Included in Any Plan
IPC Elements Absent in All Agency Plans
Pre-arrival Instructions to Family from PSAP Dispatch:
Family shall assist in expediting EMS
crew access to the patient

Family shall help prepare patient for
transport

Family shall compile a list of patient
medications

Family shall help patient meet the EMS
crews at entry of house

Infectious Disease Training
Training is provided to personnel on
Personnel shall demonstrate any new
updated protocols before they are
PPE donning and doffing competencies
implemented
before use
Personnel family members are provided training materials
Patient Treatment
PPE should be donned by personnel
utilizing checklists

Personnel to perform debrief at the
conclusion of transport, verifying
appropriate infection control procedures
were followed.
Hospital contact information is to be left
Patient belongings are to be considered
with family so that they may call for
contaminated, placed in sealed and
patient updates.
labeled biohazard bags.
All patient care documentation is to be performed after the transport is complete; no
patient care documentation is to be performed in the patient compartment
Continuity of Operations – Workforce Protection
Development of procedures to hire back retired or previously active members to
assist if personnel staffing becomes an issue
Fire Department Facilities
Station ventilation practices are optimized
Special Considerations
Pediatric patient considerations discussed

IPC OUTLIERS
Reviewing the COVID-19 pandemic plans from different fire departments and
comparing them with our IPC evaluation criteria template provided a means to
systematically analyze the compliance with national and international IPC guidelines.
Reviewing the IPC policies from multiple fire departments also allowed the study to
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identify unique IPC components. These were unique IPC features that were not expressly
contained in the IPC evaluation criteria template; however, they were implemented by
agencies to help achieve their mission statement and to better protect their personnel. The
table below (Table 6) provides the unique IPC practices identified when reviewing the
different fire department IPC documents.
Table 6: Fire Department IPC Outlier Practices
Fire Department IPC Outliers
While en-route to emergencies involving potentially infected patients, personnel will
make contact via cell phone and perform additional infection screening questions. If a
potentially infected patient is able, request that they meet responders outside.
Personnel who require quarantine will be provided with quarters to do so, preventing
possible exposure to their family members
All long-term care facilities are designated as "HIGH RISK" occupancies. All
personnel entering are required to don full COVID-19 PPE prior to entering.
Alternative decontamination method use for vehicles after infected patients are
transported (Ozone generators, disinfection foggers, UVGI machines)
Twice daily personnel temperature screening and station decon procedures
Utilization of UVGI machines to decon used N95 masks
Encouragement of personnel involvement IPC policy development
Crew mealtimes are staggered in stations with multiple companies
Online forums are established for EMS partners within regions to share consistent
policies, COVID-19 training resources, and updates
Mobile device applications used to track personnel placed under quarantine
Development of patient assessment practices that minimize crew interactions with
patients
Implementation of childcare programs to provide for crewmembers on shift
Expansion of mobile health services to better serve vulnerable populations

CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION
The results of this thesis provided several valuable outcomes regarding IPC
policies in the Fire Service. The studies' research and establishment of the IPC evaluation
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criteria template may be utilized by Fire/EMS agencies in the development or amendment
of pandemic IPC plans in the future. The IPC evaluation criteria template was
fundamental in identifying distinct strengths and weaknesses among the agencies
studied. Additionally, the study presented unique IPC elements that were utilized by fire
departments which were not included in the recommendations by the recognized
authorities.

IPC Elements Included by all Fire Departments
The 29 recommended IPC elements that every participating fire department
incorporated included IPC guidance involving PPE, patient treatment, cleaning and
disinfection procedures, post-exposure actions, and contact tracing programs. The
utilization of appropriate levels of PPE while treating infected patients is one of the
cornerstone IPC elements during an outbreak event when the engineering and
administrative controls implemented are unable to prevent these interactions from taking
place. When considering the nature of the emergency services and the hands-on role that
FF-EMTs are frequently required to provide, close patient interactions are difficult, if not
impossible, to avoid. Because COVID-19 is easily transmissible from person-to-person
airborne droplets, unprotected individuals in close proximity to an infected patient are at
a high risk of infection (Dhama et al., 2020). Every organization reviewed in this study
was found to have appropriately implemented PPE policies requiring eye protection,
gowns, gloves, and respiratory protection of N95 or better when in close proximity to a
potential COVID-19 patient. All agencies were also discovered to have instituted policies
attempting to limit the number of personnel who interacted with these potentially infected
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individuals. When rendering treatments to the infected individuals, all departments also
implemented guidelines on high-risk interventional medical procedures. Aerosol
generating procedures, for example, were detailed, and alternative treatment modalities
were included in every plan included in our study. This is noteworthy when considering
that the performance of aerosol-generating procedures emits potentially infectious viral
particulates freely into the environment, creating an increased risk of infection to anyone
nearby who has not donned the proper PPE.
Every fire department reviewed should be recognized and commended for the
unanimous compliance of ensuring face masks are used by everyone in attendance during
all patient interactions. The IPC plans reviewed included continued source control
measures even when it was necessary to administer supplemental oxygen. Several
agencies included diagrams in their policies on how best to appropriately deliver oxygen
with the continued use of patient face masks. Consistent use of face masks (source control)
has been identified as one factor related to a decreased risk of infection (Wu et al., 2004).

IPC Elements Included by the Majority of Plans
The 33 IPC elements included in 66-83% of the fire department IPC plans
contained policies to guide communication between emergency responders and the PSAP
911 dispatchers, provided strategies for optimizing PPE, screened personnel for infection,
and provided guidance for ambulance operations considerations.
As the first point of patient contact on the majority of EMS runs, the PSAP 911
dispatchers have an opportunity to provide FF-EMTs with invaluable information. With
minimal additional questioning, these dispatchers are able to identify the common signs
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and symptoms consistent with SARS COV-2 infections and relay their suspicions to
responding crews upon dispatching the call. The communications forwarded from the
PSAP 911 dispatchers can provide FF-EMTs with central details regarding the patient's
condition, the required level of PPE, the necessary EMS equipment to bring into the scene,
and the number of personnel required to render medical aid. When details about a
potentially infected patient are delivered early, the emergency responders are given the
opportunity to better prepare themselves, which can lead to improved PPE compliance
and enhanced patient care management.
The global PPE shortages experienced throughout the COVID-19 pandemic have
raised serious supply concerns for many organizations involved in health care. Fire
departments that initially reported robust PPE stockpiles quickly realized the reality of
PPE consumption during this event and were forced to implement policies promoting
sustainability. The development of procedures to optimize available PPE, such as
establishing processes to disinfect and recycle single-use N95 masks, enabled many
agencies to maintain sufficient PPE levels and continue to provide their personnel with
adequate levels of protection. Several fire departments developed policies and guidelines
detailing the safe reuse of specific PPE components.
FF-EMTs are typically employed on shift rotation schedules, working at least 24
hours at a specific station per shift, essentially living with their coworkers. This
cohabitation amongst coworkers presents a significant vulnerability for the transmission
of COVID-19. To combat this, most fire agencies surveyed implemented stringent policies
in opposition to personnel reporting to work sick. To help enforce these policies, many
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fire departments implemented pre-shift personnel screening processes. These processes
consisted of active temperature checks and screening questions before personnel were
allowed to enter the station living quarters. The study observed that some fire
departments allowed members to complete these screenings on their own recognizance,
while others required a company officer to perform the screenings on their subordinates.
The screening process is crucial when considering that an undetected COVID-19 FF-EMT
has the potential to infect an entire station.

IPC Elements Commonly Missing from Plans
The study's results indicated that 39 of the IPC recommendations were accounted
for in only 16-50% of the agencies reviewed. These important IPC elements included
details about PPE use, practices concerning fire station facilities, patient treatment
policies, and policies focused on workforce protection.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, many fire departments distributed elastomeric
respirators to their employees. These masks offer excellent respiratory protection, are
reusable, and can be disinfected by personnel with minimal effort. The disadvantage to
these masks is that they often lack filtered exhalation ports. Respirators with unfiltered
exhalation ports allow for respiratory droplets to be exhaled freely into the environment.
EMS responders wear PPE to protect themselves as well as their patients. When
considering that asymptomatic transmission was observed in 59% of the COVID-19 cases
in one study, the importance of utilizing filtered exhalation valves is evident (Johansson

et al., 2021).
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Personnel employed in the emergency services often work in uncontrolled
environments, face weather extremes, and respond to emergency scenes where they are
exposed to infectious substances. The above-mentioned working conditions are often
present during routine operations. Risks for exposure increase in the early phases of a
pandemic when the details of the novel virus transmission are limited. During a typical
shift throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, FF-EMTs often encountered situations where
they became inadvertently exposed to COVID-19 virus particulates. During these
situations, the personnel's duty gear often became contaminated as well. To minimize the
risk of exposing personnel family members to soiled uniform items, a limited number of
the fire departments implemented policies requiring employees to store all uniform items
at the stations and encouraged personnel to shower before going home. The simple act of
showering and changing into clean clothes can have a tremendous effect on eliminating
the contaminants on a person.
When an employee develops an illness and continues to report to work, they
expose their coworkers to the risk of infection. This concept is especially true when
employed in the emergency services industry. Firefighters essentially live at their stations
for the duration of their shift, residing in close proximity with their coworkers. Many
firefighters try to avoid taking sick leave because in doing so, they will have to utilize 24
hours of their paid time off bank. In recognition of the associated risks in having
potentially infected personnel report to shift and infecting their coworkers, a few of the
fire departments surveyed implemented non-punitive leave policies for personnel with
COVID-19 exposure. This type of policy allows sick personnel to take sufficient time off

35
to heal without feeling pressure to return to service. Policies such as these can have a
significant impact on the health of an agency's personnel pool.

Absent IPC Elements.
The results of this study revealed that 16 of the recommended IPC elements were
absent from every fire department plan reviewed. The missing components included
recommendations related to pre-arrival instructions, the consideration of personnel
family members, and the performance of debriefing processes following interactions with
infected patients.
The role of the PSAP 911 dispatcher during a pandemic is crucial and should be
optimized to its fullest potential. PSAP 911 dispatchers serve as a conduit of
communication between the patients and the emergency crews responding to them. Even
though the PSAP 911 dispatchers generally receive a minimal amount of medical training,
they are still able to deliver critical pre-arrival instructions to those who call 911 for help.
During a national emergency, such as a pandemic, resources will often become taxed due
to the resulting patient surges. With the implementation of modified dispatching
algorithms and screening, PSAP 911 dispatchers can help decrease the emergency
system's strain by providing potentially infected callers with pre-arrival transport
instructions and providing subacute/non-serious callers with home self-care instructions.
Effective pre-arrival instructions given to potentially infected callers can help minimize
the responding crews' interactions with infectious patients in poorly ventilated
environments. When the PSAP 911 dispatchers instruct patients or their families collect
medical history paperwork and medication lists prior to the emergency responders'
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arrival, crews will not need to search the residence to locate these crucial pieces of
information. This will minimize the amount of time first responders have to spend in
poorly ventilated environments with patients.
Previously conducted studies have indicated that one of the primary concerns for
emergency responders during infectious disease outbreaks was for their family members'
health and well-being. In recognition of this fact, fire departments need to consider
personnel's families when planning for outbreak events. By producing educational
materials regarding the COVID-19 pandemic for personnel to bring home to their family
members, agencies are given an excellent opportunity to minimize the fear and confusion
that typically accompanies outbreak events. Examples of beneficial educational resources
personnel can provide to their families include up-to-date viral transmission
characteristics, instructions on post-exposure self-care, isolation recommendations,
quarantine directives, and home social distancing recommendations.
The proper use of PPE is one of the most vital components to providing EMS
responders with adequate protection against infectious disease. The significance of
utilizing the proper PPE is especially true when emergency personnel are responding to
and treating patients infected with a novel virus. The rapid progression of the COVID-19
pandemic has caused almost every EMS provider in the U.S. to modify their PPE
guidelines and practices. Many of these amended PPE practices included the integration
of additional PPE devices. Whenever new PPE components are introduced to personnel,
it is imperative that they receive the proper education and training prior to using the new
pieces of equipment. In reviewing the IPC plans provided, deficiencies were observed in
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the education and training requirements with the introduction of the new PPE
components. The introduction of new or alternate PPE components was noted in multiple
agencies with no discussion on additional required training.
In the fire service, a common occurrence that typically follows the response to a
hazardous situation, such as a house fire, is the completion of a debriefing process. These
debriefings are generally informal practices to identify elements of the response that went
well, areas that need improvement, and focus on improving personnel safety. One clear
and significant hazardous event to firefighters recently has been the COVID-19 pandemic.
Firefighters have been recognized as a population at an increased risk of becoming
infected by this virus. Given the increased risk associated with COVID-19, fire
departments should consider implementing a debriefing process following emergency
runs involving infected patients. These debriefing processes may be assisted with the
utilization of notecard checklists where crewmembers verify their adherence to specific
IPC elements during their response. These debriefing checklists could include verification
of elements such as: donning of appropriate PPE, practicing social distancing guidelines,
avoidance of high-risk medical procedures, ensuring patients donned facemasks,
practicing the appropriate doffing procedures, and the performance of decontamination
(equipment, personnel, and emergency vehicles). During high-risk interactions, it is
paramount that the appropriate IPC elements can be verified. Alternatively, nonadherence to the appropriate IPC elements must be identified early to initiate post
exposure action procedures.
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IPC Outliers
Reviewing the COVID-19 IPC plans from multiple fire departments provided the
study with an opportunity to identify unique IPC elements not expressly defined in our
IPC evaluation criteria template. One of the unique IPC elements discovered was
encouragement of FF-EMTs responding to emergencies to contact the patient (or their
family) by cell phone prior to the arrival on scene (if time and patient's condition permit).
Establishing this communication channel allows FF-EMTs to perform additional
screening questions and to provide more focused pre-arrival instructions. The additional
screening can include questions relating to the patient's severity, such as their work of
breathing, and could indicate the necessity of performing advanced airway intervention
procedures. The additional information obtained by the FF-EMTs, who generally have
more medical training than the PSAP 911 dispatcher, will provide them with a better idea
of the patient's condition. This better overall picture will allow crews to bring only
necessary medical equipment to the scene, minimizing the amount of equipment that
needs to be decontaminated. When crews responding to the emergency conduct their own
screening of the patient, the potential for message distortion of the patient’s condition
between EMS and the PSAP 911 dispatcher is minimized.
An additional element observed among several fire department IPC plans, not
included on the IPC evaluation criteria template, was for all long-term residential facilities
to be designated as "High Risk" occupancies. The denotation of establishments as "High
Risk" requires all personnel who enter the facility to don the full complement of COVID19 PPE. Introduction of policies such as these serve to better protect emergency
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responders while they are in facilities caring for residents who have been recognized as
high risk for respiratory pathogens, such as COVID-19 (CDC, 2020b). Fire and EMS
agencies that implement policies such as these also provide the residents of these facilities
with an increased amount of protection from the FF-EMTs who may be asymptomatic and
COVID-19 positive. Providing the residents of these facilities with the highest level of
protection is imperative, given that they typically have significant comorbidities and are
the most at risk to COVID-19.
The PPE and disinfectant supply shortages experienced by health care
organizations resulting from the current pandemic prompted many to implement revised
disinfection practices for their vehicles, equipment, and essential PPE. Several fire
departments included in this study instituted processes to disinfect all used and
undamaged N95 respirators. These disinfection processes included utilizing Ultraviolet
Germicidal Irradiation (UVGI) machines, allowing for the reuse and successful
maintenance of the vital supply caches. Fire departments also utilized UVGI machines,
ozone generators, and disinfection foggers to disinfect ambulances following a confirmed
COVID-19 patient's transport. These modern disinfection practices provided agencies
with an ability to continually disinfect equipment when they had difficulty obtaining
traditional disinfection supplies.

Limitations
A significant limitation of this study was the small sample size of participating fire
departments. Even with the inclusion of large fire departments, the small sample pool
may not have accurately represented the overall fire service compliance to the industry
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recommendations noted in the IPC evaluation criteria template. The fire agencies that did
participate provided invaluable resources for evaluating and comparing critical aspects
of their COVID-19 IPC plans; however, the documents delivered may not have provided
the full view of the particular agencies' COVID-19 plan. Every fire department included
in this study had their IPC elements distributed among multiple documents. Some of the
fire departments had their IPC elements distributed among more documents than others.
The IPC elements noted to be missing from specific fire departments may have actually
been accounted for in alternate documents that were not provided to the study.
An additional limitation was that the COVID-19 pandemic was ongoing during
this study. The majority of the fire departments contacted were discovered to have
implemented policies mandating that all non-essential staff members were to work from
home. This presented the study with multiple barriers to communicating with the
appropriate agency personnel, as updated contact information on several occasions, was
unlisted and challenging to access. In turn, significant barriers were experienced while
attempting to make contact with personnel who were able to grant access to the requested
IPC-related documents.
Given the novelty of the COVID-19 pandemic and the frequent modifications to
certain IPC recommendations, several fire departments surveyed reported that they were
in the process of updating their COVID-19 protocols. In reviewing the chronological IPC
plan updates from several fire departments, the study noted instances of potentially
confusing IPC directives. The study observed policy changes from multiple agencies
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occurring several times a week. These frequent policy changes can increase the likelihood
of personnel operating on outdated IPC recommendations.
The fire department plans used in this study were all from career agencies with
full-time paid firefighters, serving mid to large-size metropolitan areas. In the U.S., only
33% of firefighters are full-time paid employees, with the rest being volunteer firefighters
(Evarts, 2020). Larger fire departments generally have more resources and personnel
available than smaller volunteer departments. Smaller volunteer fire departments may be
limited in the available staff who are able to research and develop in-depth pandemic
protocols.

Conclusion and Recommendations:
The COVID-19 pandemic is currently ongoing, and the full impact of this event
may not be realized until long after it has concluded. One thing that is certain however, is
the dramatic effects that this pandemic has had on U.S. emergency services. Fire
departments across the nation have implemented significant changes to their operational
plans to protect personnel and the communities in which they serve. Many of the response
policies were amended numerous times after their initial development to comply with the
results of the latest scientific research. In several fire departments, the updated plan
policies were delivered among various departmental documents, creating confusion and
potential for adherence to outdated policies. Every fire department reviewed was
discovered to have implemented appropriate guidance on the necessary PPE during
interactions with potentially infected patients and were also found to possess IPC plan
elements needing improvement. Fire departments have established innovative practices
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focusing on optimizing available PPE to maintain vital supply caches in the face of
substantial global shortages. The COVID-19 pandemic has changed the very definition of
normal operations within the fire service. This pandemic has called attention to many of
the issues experienced during outbreak events, indicating the need for additional research
and development in infectious disease response and emergency services preparation.
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TABLE 7: IPC evaluation review criteria
Pandemic Plan Elements:
Dedicated staff position responsible for infectious disease preparedness
All personnel are provided with copies of pandemic policies
Plan is developed in coordination with local healthcare partners (Hospitals, neighboring fire departments,
public health department, nursing homes)
Personnel are provided with details about pandemic infection prevention and control practices
Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) Modified Screening Questions
The plan indicates the implementation of modified call taker screening criteria
Signs and symptoms of infection
Travel history to effected regions
Known contact with infected persons
Additional persons at the location with signs and symptoms of infection
Call taker records call back phone number and relays this to responding crews
Call takers provide responding EMS with early notification of positive infection screening

FD1

FD2

FD3

FD4

1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1

1

1

1
1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1

1

FD5

FD6

1
1

1
1
1

1

1

1

1

1

1
1

1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1

1

1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1

Plan lists the following pre-arrival instructions
Call taker instructs family members or patient to assist with:

1
1
1

Expediting access to patient
Preparing patient for transport

1
1

Compiling list of medications
If patient condition allows, request should be made for the patient to meet crews outside
Infectious Disease Training
The plan includes the following items
All non-essential in person training is postponed in favor of pandemic specific virus-related training.

1

Training is provided on updated response protocols before they are implemented
Proper PPE Donning and Doffing procedures

1

1

1

0.5*

1

1

1
1

Training includes decontamination procedures on
Station

PPE
PPE equipment caches are maintained, appropriate quantities can be determined using tools like those
supplied by the CDC's PPE Burn Rate Calculator or equivalent.
PPE contingencies are developed (i.e. re-use recommendations, alternative PPE components)
Specific PPE criteria is provided for the call type and patient symptomology
Strategies in place to optimize PPE supplies:
Limiting personnel interactions with PUI
Utilizing reusable PPE
Limited reuse of disposable PPE
Plan lists use of the following PPE
Eye protection – face shield or goggles
Respiratory protection (N95) or better
Use of filtered respirator exhalation valves (if present)
Gowns or Tyvek suits
Single pair of gloves
Boot covers
Donning PPE
Checklist is utilized
Level of PPE is determined based on reported patient symptomology and departmental guidance
PPE is inspected to ensure it is serviceable (i.e. no cuts or tears, appropriate size)
Hand hygiene is performed
PPE is donned in correct order according to departmental guidance
Integrity of ensemble is verified by personnel prior to patient contact
Doffing PPE
Checklist is utilized
PPE is inspected for damage prior to doffing
PPE is doffed in designated areas.
Appropriate doffing procedures developed by agency
Hand hygiene is performed
If personnel duty uniform under PPE is discovered to have become soiled, personnel will return to
station for uniform change

1
1
1
1

Personnel shall demonstrate PPE donning and doffing competencies
Personnel family members are provided with training materials

EMS equipment
PPE
Vehicles

Full Score
1
1
1

1
1
1

1

1

1

1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1

1

1

1

1

1
1

1
1

1
1

1
1

1
1

1

1
1

1
1

1
1

1
1
1
1
1

1

1
1
1

1

1

1

1
1

1
1

1
1

1

1
1

1
1

1
1

1

1
1

1
1

1
1

1
1

1
1

1
1

1
1

1
1

1
1

1
0.5*

1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1

1
1
1
1
1

1

1

1

1

1
1

1
1
1
1

1

1
1
1
1
1
1

Soiled uniform items will be washed at station with disease prevention guidelines
Fire Department Facilities
Non-essential personnel work from home and are provided the resources to do so
Sick personnel are directed to stay home
Personnel screening process is implemented at the beginning of each shift
Visitors are restricted from entering facilities
Mask use is required during entire shift
Promotion of social distancing
Personnel uniform items kept at station
Hand sanitizer dispensers are readily available
Off going personnel shall shower before going home
Station ventilation practices are optimized
Patient Treatment Practices
Personnel are instructed to avoid touching their face
Hand hygiene is performed before and after all patient contact
Perform infection screening on all patients

1

1

1

1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1

Ensure patient and family are wearing face masks during all interactions
N95 or better respiratory protection will be worn by personnel on all patient interactions
Patients should be moved outside
Limit number of personnel who contact patients
Avoid interacting with patient and family in poorly ventilated environments

1
1
1
1

1

1
1

1
1
1

1

1
1
1
1
1

1
1

1

1

1
1
1
1

1
1

1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1

1
1
1

1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
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1

1
1

1
1

1
1

1

1
1

1
1

1

1

1
1

1

1

1

1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Hospital information is left with family so that they may call for an update.
If patient requires O2, airway device is placed with continued use of face mask

1

1

1

Only necessary equipment is brought to the scene to avoid unnecessary equipment contamination
Implementation of modified treat and release policies

1
1

1

1
1

Aerosol-generating procedures are defined and discussed
Supplement metered dose inhalers instead of nebulizers

1
1

1
1

1
1

HEPA filter use on advanced airway exhalation ports.
Patient belongings are considered contaminated and placed in a biohazard bag, sealed, and labelled.

1

1

Early notification of a suspected COVID-19 patient to the receiving facility.
Cleaning and Disinfection Procedures
Decon procedures for Station facility
Decon procedures for EMS equipment
Decon procedures for PPE
Decon procedures for department vehicles
Frequent hand hygiene is encouraged
Establishment of Approved Disinfectants
Use of disinfectant wipes opposed to spray, when in enclosed compartments
Biohazard cleaners contracted for gross station decontamination
Facility outbreak is declared if a workplace has 2 or more confirmed or probable infection cases within a 14
day period.

1

1

1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1

Decontamination checklists created and provided to crews
Post Exposure Definitions and Actions
Low-Risk Exposure (exposure to infected individuals while following infection prevention guidelines)–
twice daily self-assessment, monitor for s/s, no work restrictions

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

High-Risk Exposure (personnel without appropriate PPE, who interreact within 6 feet of infected individuals
for 15 minutes or greater; or who are exposed to infectious secretions for any amount of time)
14-day quarantine and self-monitor for s/s of infection
-orQuarantine for 10 days, if no symptoms have been observed following daily monitoring, work restrictions
are concluded
-orQuarantine is discontinued after Day 7, following a diagnostic specimen negative test, with no observed
symptoms during daily monitoring.

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Agency provides testing for potential exposures, at no cost
Contact Tracing & Documentation

1

1

1

Personnel who develop signs and symptoms of infection shall self-isolate and notify agency infection
control officer.
Personnel with on the job exposures are documented and communicated with the local health authorities to
ensure accurate contact tracing is performed

1

Every contact with a PUI is documented through an agency established reporting system.
State or local public health authorities are notified of all PUI.
Continuity of Operations – Workforce Protection
Nonpunitive sick-leave policies are developed for personnel with exposures while on duty.

1
1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1
1

1
1

1

1
1

1
1

1
1

1

1

1

1

1

Maintaining contact with employees in quarantine and planning for their replacements.
Vaccinations are strongly encouraged

1

1

Novel virus vaccine delivery plans are developed for the rapid vaccination of all department personnel.
Additional emergency response vehicles are staffed to meet patient surge needs

1
1

1
1

Non-essential department personnel are reassigned and retrained to assist in mission essential tasks.
Mental health counseling resources are available, and personnel are encouraged to seek assistance if the need
should arise.

1

1
1

1
1

1

1
1
1
1

1

1

1

1

1
1
1

1
1

1

Ambulance Operations
Optimized ventilation strategies in ambulance

1

1

1

1

1

Driver and patient compartments are separated.
PPE guidelines are in place to prevent contamination of driver compartment

1
1

1

1
1

1
1

1
1

Telecommuting tools provided for non-essential employees and leadership
Return to work policies are in place for infected personnel who have recovered
Development of procedures to hire back retired or previously active members to assist if personnel staffing
becomes an issue.

1
1

1
1

1

1

1

Additional passengers (family, etc.) shall not be transported.
Non-essential compartments and cabinets for patient care are sealed.

1
1

1

1

All documentation is performed after the transport is complete, no patient care documentation is to be
performed in the patient compartment.

1

Personnel shall perform debrief at the conclusion of transport to verify appropriate infection control
procedures were followed throughout mission.
1

1

Total:

1
77

1
71

72

62

DOCUMENTS ACCESSED:

26

46

6

4

PUI transfer of care process into the hospital is developed according to local guidelines, to minimize
interaction with unprotected individuals
Special Considerations
Pediatric patient considerations
Geriatric patient considerations

SOURCES:
1. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
2. World Health Organization (WHO)
3. U.S. Fire Administration (USFA)
4. International Association for Fire Fighters (IAFF)
5. Technical Resources, Assistance Center, and Information Exchange (TRACIE)
6. Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology (APIC)
7. Occupational Safety and Health Agency (OSHA)
8. The Federal Healthcare Resilience Working Group (HRWG)
*Disclaimer - many of the recommendations were promoted by more than one of these organizations*

1

1

48

71

1
1
117

7

10

CONSISTENCIES AMONG PARTICIPATING AGENCIES:
All organizations included these IPC elements - 29
All organizations disregarded these IPC elements - 16
66-83% of the organizations included these elements - 33
16-50% of the organizations included these elements - 39

44

REFERENCES
Alwidyan, M. T., Oteir, A. O., & Trainor, J. (2020). Working During Pandemic
Disasters: Views and Predictors of EMS Providers. Disaster medicine and public
health preparedness, 1-7. https://doi.org/10.1017/dmp.2020.131
Barnett, D. J., Levine, R., Thompson, C. B., Wijetunge, G. U., Oliver, A. L., Bentley, M.
A., Neubert, P. D., Pirrallo, R. G., Links, J. M., & Balicer, R. D. (2010). Gauging
U.S. Emergency Medical Services workers' willingness to respond to pandemic
influenza using a threat- and efficacy-based assessment framework. PloS one,
5(3), e9856-e9856. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0009856
Barry, J. M. (2004, 2004/01/20). The site of origin of the 1918 influenza pandemic and its
public health implications. Journal of Translational Medicine, 2(1), 3.
https://doi.org/10.1186/1479-5876-2-3
CDC, C. f. D. C. a. P. (2019, June 11, 2019). 2009 H1N1 Pandemic (H1N1pdm09 virus).
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/2009-h1n1-pandemic.html
CDC, C. f. D. C. a. P. (2020a, December 8, 2020). Clinical Presentation.
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/clinical-guidance-managementpatients.html
CDC, C. f. D. C. a. P. (2020b, Nov. 20, 2020). Infection Control for Nursing Homes.
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/long-term-care.html
CDC, C. f. D. C. a. P. (2020c, July 15, 2020). Interim Recommendations for Emergency
Medical Services (EMS) Systems and 911 Public Safety Answering
Points/Emergency Communication Centers (PSAP/ECCs) in the United States
During the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Pandemic.
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/guidance-for-ems.html
CDC, C. f. D. C. a. P. (2020d, December 22, 2020). Symptoms of Coronavirus.
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/symptoms-testing/symptoms.html
CDC, C. f. D. C. a. P. (October 19, 2020). Duration of Isolation and Precautions for
Adults with COVID-19. https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/hcp/duration-isolation.html
Chang, J. C., Johnson, J. S., & Olmsted, R. N. (2020). Demystifying theoretical concerns
involving respirators with exhalation valves during COVID-19 pandemic.
American journal of infection control, 48(12), 1564-1565.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ajic.2020.08.031

45
Cohen, J., & Rodgers, Y. V. M. (2020, Dec). Contributing factors to personal protective
equipment shortages during the COVID-19 pandemic. Prev Med, 141, 106263.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ypmed.2020.106263
Dhama, K., Khan, S., Tiwari, R., Sircar, S., Bhat, S., Malik, Y. S., Singh, K. P.,
Chaicumpa, W., Bonilla-Aldana, D. K., & Rodriguez-Morales, A. J. (2020).
Coronavirus Disease 2019-COVID-19. Clinical microbiology reviews, 33(4),
e00028-00020. https://doi.org/10.1128/CMR.00028-20
EMS Infectious Disease Playbook (2017). (U. S. D. o. H. a. H. S. H. Technical Resources
Assistance Center and Information Exchange (TRACIE), Assistant Secretary for
Preparedness and Response (ASPR), Ed.) https://www.ems.gov/pdf/ASPR-EMSInfectious-Disease-Playbook-June-2017.pdf
Evarts, B., Stein, Gary P. (2020). US Fire Department Profile – 2018.
https://www.nfpa.org//-/media/Files/News-and-Research/Fire-statistics-andreports/Emergency-responders/osFDProfileTables.pdf
Fang, X., Li, S., Yu, H., Wang, P., Zhang, Y., Chen, Z., Li, Y., Cheng, L., Li, W., Jia, H.,
& Ma, X. (2020). Epidemiological, comorbidity factors with severity and
prognosis of COVID-19: a systematic review and meta-analysis. Aging, 12(13),
12493-12503. https://doi.org/10.18632/aging.103579
FICEMS, F. I. C. o. E. (2009). State EMS System Pandemic Influenza Preparedness: A
Report of the FICEMS.
https://www.ems.gov/pdf/State_EMS_System_Pandemic_Influenza_Preparedness
.pdf
Fineberg, H. V. (2014, Apr 3). Pandemic preparedness and response--lessons from the
H1N1 influenza of 2009. N Engl J Med, 370(14), 1335-1342.
https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMra1208802
Friese, G., MS, NRP. (Jul 31, 2020). Face masks: Here’s what cops, firefighters, medics
and COs have to say about use, policy and effectiveness. FireRescue1.
https://www.firerescue1.com/personal-protective-equipment-ppe/articles/facemasks-heres-what-cops-firefighters-medics-and-cos-have-to-say-about-usepolicy-and-effectiveness-oy4meLGHK1wzg57H/
Gray, G. C., & Kayali, G. (2009, 2009/04/01/). Facing pandemic influenza threats: The
importance of including poultry and swine workers in preparedness plans1.
Poultry Science, 88(4), 880-884. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.3382/ps.200800335
He, X., Lau, E. H. Y., Wu, P., Deng, X., Wang, J., Hao, X., Lau, Y. C., Wong, J. Y.,
Guan, Y., Tan, X., Mo, X., Chen, Y., Liao, B., Chen, W., Hu, F., Zhang, Q.,
Zhong, M., Wu, Y., Zhao, L., Zhang, F., Cowling, B. J., Li, F., & Leung, G. M.

46
(2020, 2020/05/01). Temporal dynamics in viral shedding and transmissibility of
COVID-19. Nature Medicine, 26(5), 672-675. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591020-0869-5
HHS, U. S. D. o. H. a. H. S. (2021). Topic Collection: COVID-19 PreHospital/Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Resources.
https://asprtracie.hhs.gov/technical-resources/114/covid-19-pre-hospital-emncymedical-services-ems-resources/99
Huttunen, R., & Syrjänen, J. (2014, 2014/09/01). Healthcare workers as vectors of
infectious diseases. European Journal of Clinical Microbiology & Infectious
Diseases, 33(9), 1477-1488. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10096-014-2119-6
Jester, B. J., Uyeki, T. M., Patel, A., Koonin, L., & Jernigan, D. B. (2018). 100 Years of
Medical Countermeasures and Pandemic Influenza Preparedness. American
Journal of Public Health, 108(11), 1469-1472.
https://doi.org/10.2105/ajph.2018.304586
JHU, J. H. U. (2021, March 27, 2021). COVID-19 Dashboard by the Center for Systems
Science and Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University (JHU).
https://www.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423
467b48e9ecf6
Johansson, M. A., Quandelacy, T. M., Kada, S., Prasad, P. V., Steele, M., Brooks, J. T.,
Slayton, R. B., Biggerstaff, M., & Butler, J. C. (2021). SARS-CoV-2
Transmission From People Without COVID-19 Symptoms. JAMA Network Open,
4(1), e2035057-e2035057. https://doi.org/10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.35057
Jones, B. A., Grace, D., Kock, R., Alonso, S., Rushton, J., Said, M. Y., McKeever, D.,
Mutua, F., Young, J., McDermott, J., & Pfeiffer, D. U. (2013). Zoonosis
emergence linked to agricultural intensification and environmental change.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America,
110(21), 8399-8404. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1208059110
Jordan, D., Dr. Tumpey, Terrance, Jester, Barbara. (2019, December 17, 2019). The
Deadliest Flu: The Complete Story of the Discovery and Reconstruction of the
1918 Pandemic Virus. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
Retrieved January 10th, 2021 from https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemicresources/reconstruction-1918-virus.html
Kelly, H. (2011, July 2011). The classical definition of a pandemic is not elusive.
https://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/89/7/11-088815/en/
Leiss, J. k., Ratcliffe, J. M., Lyden, J. T., Sousa, S., Orelien, J. G., Boal, W. L., & Jagger,
J. (2006, 2006/09/01/). Blood Exposure Among Paramedics: Incidence Rates
From the National Study to Prevent Blood Exposure in Paramedics. Annals of

47
Epidemiology, 16(9), 720-725.
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.annepidem.2005.12.007
Lemon, S. M., Hamburg, Margaret A., Sparling, P. Frederick, Choffnes, Eileen R., Mack,
Alison (2007). Ethical and Legal Considerations in Mitigating Pandemic
Disease: Workshop Summary. (I. o. M. U. F. o. M. Threats, Ed.). National
Academies Press. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK54163/
Li, R., Richmond, P., & Roehner, B. (2018, 03/10). Effect of population density on
epidemics. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 510.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2018.07.025
LOC, L. o. C. (2020, December 30, 2020). World Health Organization: Legal Responses
to Health Emergencies. https://www.loc.gov/law/help/healthemergencies/who.php
Madhav, N., Oppenheim, B., Gallivan, M., Mulembakani, P., Rubin, E., & Wolfe, N.
(2017). Pandemics: Risks, Impacts, and Mitigation. In rd, D. T. Jamison, H.
Gelband, S. Horton, P. Jha, R. Laxminarayan, C. N. Mock, & R. Nugent (Eds.),
Disease Control Priorities: Improving Health and Reducing Poverty.
https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0527-1_ch17
Malcolm, K., Raftery, Isolde, Farmer, Megan. (2020, March 6, 2020). The ominous days
leading up to the coronavirus outbreak at Life Care Center in Kirkland. National
Public Radio NPR. https://www.kuow.org/stories/the-days-leading-up-to-theoutbreak-at-life-care-center-in-kirkland
Mears, G., M.D, Armstrong, Beth, MAM, CAE, Fernandez, Antonio R., MS, PhD,
NREMT-P, Mann, N. Clay, PhD, MS, McGinnis, Kevin, MPS, EMT-P, Raisor,
Mears, Cindy, RN, BSN, MA, Sanddal, Nels D., MS, REMT-B, Sanddal, Teri L.,
BS, REMT-B, Shofer, Frances S., PhD. (2011). 2011 National EMS Assessment.
https://www.ems.gov/FICEMS-Reports/FICEMS-Reports-DocsMemos/2012/National_EMS_Assessment_2011.pdf
Morens, D. M., Taubenberger, J. K., Harvey, H. A., & Memoli, M. J. (2010). The 1918
influenza pandemic: lessons for 2009 and the future. Critical care medicine, 38(4
Suppl), e10-e20. https://doi.org/10.1097/CCM.0b013e3181ceb25b
NEMSSC, N. E. S. C. (2017). Guide for Developing an EMS Agency Safety Program
http://www.naemt.org/docs/default-source/ems-health-and-safetydocuments/nemssc/ems-safety-program-guide-10-1117.pdf?status=Temp&sfvrsn=0.13715842522823762
NFPA, N. F. P. A. (2019, November, 2019). Fire Department Calls.
https://www.nfpa.org/News-and-Research/Data-research-and-tools/EmergencyResponders/Fire-department-calls

48

Nunez, S., Moreno, A., Green, K., & Villar, J. (2000, Apr). The stethoscope in the
Emergency Department: a vector of infection? Epidemiol Infect, 124(2), 233-237.
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0950268800003563
Okamoto, K., Rhee, Y., Schoeny, M., Lolans, K., Cheng, J., Reddy, S., Weinstein, R. A.,
Hayden, M. K., & Popovich, K. J. (2019). Impact of doffing errors on healthcare
worker self-contamination when caring for patients on contact precautions.
Infection Control & Hospital Epidemiology, 40(5), 559-565.
https://doi.org/10.1017/ice.2019.33
Respiratory Protecion, (2011). https://www.osha.gov/lawsregs/regulations/standardnumber/1910/1910.134
Bloodborne pathogens, (2012). https://www.osha.gov/lawsregs/regulations/standardnumber/1910/1910.1030
Personal Protective Equipment, (2016). https://www.osha.gov/lawsregs/regulations/standardnumber/1910/1910.132
OSHA, O. S. H. A. (2020a). Hazard Recognition.
https://www.osha.gov/coronavirus/hazards
OSHA, O. S. H. A. (2020b, January 15th, 2020). Infectious Diseases Rulemaking.
https://www.osha.gov/infectious-diseases/rulemaking
Pennycook, G., McPhetres, J., Zhang, Y., Lu, J. G., & Rand, D. G. (2020, 2020/07/01).
Fighting COVID-19 Misinformation on Social Media: Experimental Evidence for
a Scalable Accuracy-Nudge Intervention. Psychological Science, 31(7), 770-780.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797620939054
Rebmann, T., Charney, R. L., Loux, T. M., Turner, J. A., Abbyad, Y. S., & Silvestros, M.
(2020, 2020/09/02). Emergency Medical Services Personnel’s Pandemic
Influenza Training Received and Willingness to Work during a Future Pandemic.
Prehospital Emergency Care, 24(5), 601-609.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10903127.2019.1701158
Rebmann, T., Vassallo, A., & Holdsworth, J. E. (2020). Availability of personal
protective equipment and infection prevention supplies during the first month of
the COVID-19 pandemic: A national study by the APIC COVID-19 task force.
American journal of infection control, S0196-6553(0120)30814-30812.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ajic.2020.08.029
SHEA, T. S. F. H. E. O. A. (2019). COVID-19 PPE Shortages https://sheaonline.org/index.php/policy/resources/key-issues/covid-19-ppe-shortages

49
To, K. K., Tsang, O. T., Leung, W. S., Tam, A. R., Wu, T. C., Lung, D. C., Yip, C. C.,
Cai, J. P., Chan, J. M., Chik, T. S., Lau, D. P., Choi, C. Y., Chen, L. L., Chan, W.
M., Chan, K. H., Ip, J. D., Ng, A. C., Poon, R. W., Luo, C. T., Cheng, V. C.,
Chan, J. F., Hung, I. F., Chen, Z., Chen, H., & Yuen, K. Y. (2020, May).
Temporal profiles of viral load in posterior oropharyngeal saliva samples and
serum antibody responses during infection by SARS-CoV-2: an observational
cohort study. Lancet Infect Dis, 20(5), 565-574. https://doi.org/10.1016/S14733099(20)30196-1
United, N. N. (2020, May 20, 2020). New survey of nurses provides frontline proof of
widespread employer, government disregard for nurse and patient safety, mainly
through lack of optimal PPE. https://www.nationalnursesunited.org/press/newsurvey-results
USFA, U. s. F. A. (2020a, December 17, 2020). COVID-19 infection control resources
for fire and EMS. https://www.usfa.fema.gov/coronavirus/infection_control/
USFA, U. S. F. A. (2020b). Firefighter fatalities in the United States.
https://apps.usfa.fema.gov/firefighterfatalities/fatalityData/incidentDataReport?keywords=covid&lastName=&classific
ationCode=&fatalCauseCode=63&fatalInjuryTypeCode=&deathDateRange1=&d
eathYear=2020&activityTypeCode=&dutyTypeCode=&fixedProperyTypeCode=
&incidentDateRange1=&incidentYear=&_emergencyDutyFilterCB=&searchAga
inAction=indexAdvanced&advancedSearch=Search
Ventura, C., Gibson, C., Denton, E., Knauth, C., Saraya, M., Court, E., Kameen, P., &
Collier, G. (2020). An overview of Emergency Medical Services pandemic
response in the United States and its implications during the era of COVID-19.
https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.20667.64807
Ventura, C. G., C.; Collier, G. D. (2020, May). Emergency Medical Services resource
capacity and competency amid COVID-19 in the United States: preliminary
findings from a national survey. Heliyon, 6(5), e03900.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2020.e03900
Warren, T. N. (2016). Standard Operating Procedures: The First Step to a Safer
Fireground. Fire Engineering.
https://www.fireengineering.com/2016/12/22/224186/standard-operatingprocedures-the-first-step-to-a-safer-fireground/#gref
WHO, W. H. O. (2010, 24 February 2010). What is a pandemic?
https://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/frequently_asked_questions/pandemic/e
n/
WHO, W. H. O. (2020a, April 27, 2020). Archived: WHO Timeline - COVID-19.
https://www.who.int/news/item/27-04-2020-who-timeline---covid-19

50

WHO, W. H. O. (2020b, November 4, 2020). Considerations for implementing and
adjusting public health and social measures in the context of COVID-19.
https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/considerations-in-adjusting-publichealth-and-social-measures-in-the-context-of-covid-19-interim-guidance
WHO, W. H. O. (2020c, September 17, 2020). Keep health workers safe to keep patients
safe: WHO. https://www.who.int/news/item/17-09-2020-keep-health-workerssafe-to-keep-patients-safe-who
Woodside, J., RN, MSN, COHN-S, Rebmann, Terri, PhD, RN, CIC, Williams, Carolyn,
RN, BSN, Woodin, Jeff, NREMT-P, FAHA. (2013). Guide to Infection
Prevention in Emergency Medical Services. the Association for Professionals in
Infection Control and Epidemiology.
Wu, J., Xu, F., Zhou, W., Feikin, D. R., Lin, C.-Y., He, X., Zhu, Z., Liang, W., Chin, D.
P., & Schuchat, A. (2004). Risk factors for SARS among persons without known
contact with SARS patients, Beijing, China. Emerging infectious diseases, 10(2),
210-216. https://doi.org/10.3201/eid1002.030730
Wu, Z., & McGoogan, J. M. (2020). Characteristics of and Important Lessons From the
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Outbreak in China: Summary of a Report
of 72 314 Cases From the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention.
JAMA, 323(13), 1239-1242. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.2648

